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Abstract—This article discusses the changes that are the re-
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The new document contains less information about the owner,
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1. Introduction
Reducing the number of safety features that could be used
for simple authentication of a person in new personal iden-
tity card (PIC) is another step that diminishes the protection
of the public against crime. Today, being equipped with
somebody else’s personal identity card, a thief can cause
substantial losses to the rightful owner. With the new per-
sonal identity card, a criminal will be able to ruin them
utterly.
2. The New Personal Identity Card
The term “identity theft” refers to an instance of actively
impersonating another person, while at the same time using
their image or other personal details in order to cause them
financial or personal damage [1].
Among the various tools that make impersonating another
person possible or easier, the personal identity card (PIC)
and the passport feature prominently. Most commonly, it is
the PIC that is used fraudulently, the document being the
easiest one to use in fraud, also because it lacks a finger-
print. Now, further weaknesses are to be introduced: there
will not be a signature nor information on the owner’s
height or eye color. An additional drawback is the “new”
idea for a front view photograph. The requirement for
a front view photograph introduced under the new regu-
lation is in fact a retrograde step that brings us back to the
19th century. This type of view came into common use
in France back in 1888 when creating a register of recidi-
vists. The front view has always been considered to be
unappealing and not to do justice to the wealth of people’s
facial features, but this simplified and flat representation
of the human face was introduced to facilitate a few sim-
ple measurements: the distance between the pupils and the
width of the nose, the mouth and the entire neurocranium.
Further measurements of the length of the nose, the height
of the forehead and the length of the ear were taken from
a profile-view photograph taken alongside the front view
photograph.
3. Safety Features
When in the previous two decades all reasons were cited to
discredit fingerprinting as an authentication measure, one
major argument against it were protests by so-called “law-
abiding citizens”. For them, being fingerprinted would be
tantamount to being treated as common criminals and an
insult. I am wondering whether these indignant defenders
of civic dignity will speak out again when they see their ex-
pressionless photographs on their new PICs and how much
outrage they will cause once they find out that as early as in
the 19th century front view photographs became the stan-
dard way of portraying recidivists, and later all criminals.
I need to add that a front view image of a face is the easiest
one to be identified by a facial recognition system. In the
absence of more effective facial recognition software, the
mugshot-type photograph is today’s choice. Note that there
is also no effective human recognition software based on
the shape of the auricle, visible in three quarter angle (half-
profile) photographs, although experts can identify a person
on that basis [2], [3].
Coming back to the peculiar idea of removing the owner’s
signature from the PIC, the argument to do away with it
was not the lack of a method for the automated authenti-
cation of a signature, but the fact that a signature changes
over time. Well, a signature is a reflection of a record in the
brain. And the brain naturally changes: it learns, matures,
stabilizes, fatigues, suffers from diseases, and grows old.
However, a signature written by a literate adult is so rich
in graphic features that, despite changes, it can be used for
authentication for decades. Moreover, differences between
an actual signature and its original sample can help deter-
mine the age and the physical and mental condition of the
undersigned person.
Why such a sudden departure from the graphic signature?
Has the percentage of illiterate people grown so signifi-
cantly? Two years ago, a scandal erupted when it turned
out that the newly-appointed U.S. Treasury Secretary,
Jacob J. Lew, could not write a normal signature, producing
instead a sequence of loops resembling a telephone hand-
set cord. This, however, was more of a social scandal than
a symptom of a global trend. The signature, an apparent
sign of the official’s functional illiteracy, was not accepted
and had to be changed.
Until now, the identity thief has had to memorize the per-
sonal details shown on a PIC, take a while to practice the
signature based on the miniature facsimile, and he could
easily take out a loan to purchase expensive and easily mar-
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ketable goods. Before a notice of the theft of a PIC reaches
the lost PIC database, the thief may engage in several such
transactions. The Japanese proverb “no naked man ever
lost anything” still holds, but the latest version of the PIC
will be a tool for crooks to drive their victims into debt
they will not be able to repay in a lifetime.
A fingerprint depicted on a PIC would prevent such crimes.
However, the proposal to include a fingerprint on the PIC
faces opposition on many fronts. For example, several years
ago, sensational news was publicized that somewhere in
Asia cases had been reported of fingers being cut off to
obtain access to the victims’ money using an ATM. Al-
though a number of methods were promptly developed for
the examination of the vital processes of the finger as well
as a number of methods using other biometric features of
living people, the circles interested in eliminating dacty-
loscopy from authentication methods managed to obviate
the danger facing their interests [4], [5].
The latest version of the PIC precludes such bloody scenar-
ios, but this is the only good news. The bad news is that the
new PIC does not include a sample signature, allowing the
identity thief to write any signature under any document,
including signing the disadvantageous disposal of a PIC’s
rightful owner’s property.
4. The Future
The irrational process of minimizing the number of fea-
tures allowing to authenticate a PIC is snowballing. In the
next version of the document, and it is going to be the
penultimate one, further details will probably be scrapped:
• date of birth – this piece of information is redundant
as it is already included in the first six digits of the
PESEL identification number used in Poland,
• sex – a feature that can be changed at will, sex is
even less permanent than eye color, height and sig-
nature, which have already been removed from the
PIC as being impermanent. In addition, the penul-
timate digit of the PESEL number indicates sex as
disclosed in the entry of birth,
• place of birth – this information can be the basis of
discrimination,
• parents’ given names – they can also be the basis of
discrimination.
In the last version, the given names and the surname may
also be removed as an appropriately extended PESEL num-
ber will contain all the information necessary to identify
the owner (not the holder!) of a PIC, and in particular to
identify his bank account. The photograph will probably
stay. It may even be a color photograph of a slightly larger
size, allowing the PIC to be used as a public transport pass
or a gym membership card.
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